사외이사의 정치적 관계가 주가붕괴위험과 타인자본비용의 관계에 미치는 영향

This study investigates the economic impact after stock price crash risk. First, we examine the cost of debt after stock price crash risk. The rate of return on investment required by an investor is positively related to the level of risk, therefore the cost of debt will increase relatively. Secondly, we examine the possible effect of political connections of outside directors on the relationship between stock price crash risk and the cost of debt. There are doubts whether ex-bureaucrat outside directors are used as expensive insurance, so-called lobbyists for the company, regarding to the reason of appointment ex-bureaucrat outside directors. Using the firms listed from 2010 to 2017, our findings are follows. First, the risk of stock price crash increase the cost of debt. The higher the risk of stock price crash, the higher the borrowing rates and the lower bond ratings. Secondly, we find weak evidence that the companies with ex-bureaucrat outside directors show lower cost of debt even after stock price crash risk. This indicates that the effect of stock price crash risk on cost of debt is different between the companies with ex-bureaucrat outside directors and without ex-bureaucrat outside directors. It is meaningful in that we attempt to find the incentives to appoint ex-bureaucrats as outside directors and their external influence. We expect the results of this study will help regulatory agency to make the policy and operate of outside director system.