사외이사 활동성과 저축은행 연체대출비율: 대표이사, 사외이사 재직기간 및 수익성

This paper studies how the activity of outside director effects on the loan delinquency of Korean savings banks. In addition, this study shows the effects of CEO and outside director’s tenures and savings banks’ profitability on the relation between the activity of outside director and loan delinquency. First, we find a negative relation between outside director activity and loan delinquency. The result implies that a high level of outside director’s activity can strengthen monitoring effects by alleviating information asymmetry and improving the ability of outside director and then reduce the loan delinquency. Second, it seems that the vigorous activity of outside director can alleviate the negative effects of CEO and outside director’s short tenures. However, the interaction term between the activity and low-profitability is insignificant. These results imply that savings banks might entice outside directors to attend the board of directors, especially if CEO and outside director have short tenures.