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학술논문경영학연구2020.12 발행KCI 피인용 8

최고경영자 교체와 연구개발투자

CEO Turnover and R&D Investment

류지호(한국로봇산업진흥원); 김희정(한국항공우주연구원)

49권 6호, 1415~1452쪽

초록

This study empirically analyzed the impact of variables related to CEO turnover on R&D investment, such as CEO turnover rate, timing of turnover, and type of turnover. In addition, the study examined the impact of Chaebol governance on the relationship between CEO turnover and R&D investment. It was aimed at explaining the phenomenon of continuous R&D investment being made even during the relatively short term tenure of CEOs of Korean firms through the moderating effect of Chaebol governance. The empirical analysis results are as follows. First, the more frequent CEO changes were made, the less R&D investment was made. Second, an analysis of R&D investment before and after CEO turnover showed that R&D investment decreased significantly in the year of turnover and one year after the turnover of CEO. Third, the effect on R&D investment was different depending on the type of CEO turnover. Fourth, as a result of considering Chaebol governance structure at the same time, it was confirmed that Chaebol governance controled the inducement for reducing R&D investment due to the replacement of CEO of individual company. These results suggest that studies should simultaneously consider the effects of Chaebol governance, along with the characteristics of individual firms.

Abstract

This study empirically analyzed the impact of variables related to CEO turnover on R&D investment, such as CEO turnover rate, timing of turnover, and type of turnover. In addition, the study examined the impact of Chaebol governance on the relationship between CEO turnover and R&D investment. It was aimed at explaining the phenomenon of continuous R&D investment being made even during the relatively short term tenure of CEOs of Korean firms through the moderating effect of Chaebol governance. The empirical analysis results are as follows. First, the more frequent CEO changes were made, the less R&D investment was made. Second, an analysis of R&D investment before and after CEO turnover showed that R&D investment decreased significantly in the year of turnover and one year after the turnover of CEO. Third, the effect on R&D investment was different depending on the type of CEO turnover. Fourth, as a result of considering Chaebol governance structure at the same time, it was confirmed that Chaebol governance controled the inducement for reducing R&D investment due to the replacement of CEO of individual company. These results suggest that studies should simultaneously consider the effects of Chaebol governance, along with the characteristics of individual firms.

발행기관:
한국경영학회
DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.17287/kmr.2020.49.6.1415
분류:
경영학

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최고경영자 교체와 연구개발투자 | 경영학연구 2020 | AskLaw | 애스크로 AI