이익조정과 단기 재무성과: 공공기관의 감사위원 및 기관장의 조절효과를 중심으로

This study analyzed the effect of earnings management on short-term financial performance, focusing on the interaction effects of member of audit committee and CEO. First, the member of audit committee served as a suppressor of the effect of the accrual earnings management, which is relatively more likely to be found externally. However, the effect of the real earnings management, which has a relatively low risk of being found externally, was not curbed by the member of audit committee, but rather increased significantly. Second, the shorter the term of the CEO and the more likely he or she is to work in the political field (e.g. politician) after retirement, the greater the increase in short-term financial performance through earnings management during the term of the CEO. The analysis results of this study suggest, first, that the performance-based salary method for members of audit committees should be distinguished from that of institutions and the CEO. Second, if the CEO is appointed, he or she needs to guarantee their tenure, and he or she needs to be replaced by more objective standards such as evaluation of the public institution's management performance rather than political motivation. Third, this study shows that the post-retirement goals and expectations of the CEO may change the way the agency operates during the term of the CEO. In particular, in order to go into the political field after retirement, the reputation of the agency's operation is one of the important criteria, suggesting that there is a reason to increase short-term institutional performance.