재무보고의 공격성과 세무보고의 공격성：기업의 유인과 능력을 중심으로

[Purpose] Managers have incentives to boost financial reporting income while they try to minimize income reported to the tax authority. This study examines the relation between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness. More importantly, we investigate the effect of firm’s abilities and incentives on the relation between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness. [Methodology] We define financial reporting aggressiveness as upward earnings management that may or may not be within the confines of accounting standards, and use the performance－matched discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting aggressiveness. Tax reporting aggressiveness is defined as downward manipulation of taxable income through tax planning, and is measured by the discretionary portion of book－tax differences introduced by Desai and Dharmapala (2006). [Findings] We find a significantly negative relation between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness. More importantly, we find that financially distressed firms, compared to others, are more likely to manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same reporting period. In contrast, firms with Big N auditors and firms in regulated industries avoid being aggressive for both financial and tax reporting purposes. [Implications] This study provides empirical evidence that firm’s abilities and incentives affect the relation between financial and tax reporting aggressiveness. This finding offers an explanation for the mixed results in the prior studies.