실질적 최고경영자의 존재와 임원 보수의 공시품질

In 2013, the company‘s annual report began to disclose executives’ pay information if executives receive compensation more than 500 million won a year. Most of prior studies have defined CEO as explicit CEO in the annual reports, whereas this paper identifies CEO who exert substantial influence based on executives’ pay information. Using executives’ pay information which is publicly disclosed in Korea under the capital market act of 2013, the number of disclosing executives’ pay has been increasing year by year. Also the percentage of the inside director of the top pay receiver has declined since 2015, while it has increased significantly in 2018. When looking at the top 10 companies with two or more executives who receive compensation more than 500 million won per year, most of the top pay receiver are the controlling shareholders. On the other hand, the second-level compensation receiver is professional managers. Also, we find that there are differences in executives’ compensation disclosures among companies. The above results indicate that there is a possibility that there is substantial CEO who would likely to avoid the legal responsibility for the company’s business activities and is more likely to receive compensation than explicit CEO in the company. We find that substantial CEO is less likely to disclose executives’ pay disclosure. This result suggest that substantial CEO has an incentive to comply the law at least associated with his or her executive pay disclosure by hiding the details of pay information.