연대보증 폐지가 신용보증 운용성과에 미치는 효과 분석

With the enforcement of the policy to completely abolish the joint liability on guarantees and loans by public institutions (April 2018), the necessity of upgrading responsible management review when supplying policy financing is emphasized. This study uses the 2014-2018 data of all start-ups newly used credit guarantees in 2016, when the joint liability was partly abolished for excellent start-ups, to analyze the effect of the joint liability exemption on the operation performance of credit guarantee. We derived the following results through empirical models such as propensity score matching and Heckman 2-stage estimator, to remove the selectivity bias. First, it is estimated that the joint liability exemption significantly increased the probability of accidents of public credit guarantees. Second, it is estimated that the responsible management review has the effect of reducing part of the probability of insolvency due to the joint liability exemption, while it is difficult to offset all the insolvency due to the joint liability exemption. Third, the estimation of the difference-in-difference and the propensity score matching models shows that there was no significant difference in employment and growth effects between firms exempted from joint liability and non-exempt firms using public credit guarantees. The increase in net insolvency of credit guarantee institutions, due to complete abolishment of joint liability, will erode the institution's basic property, resulting in a decrease in guarantee supply capacity during an economic crisis or in the mid- to long-term. To solve the problem of the increase in financial management costs accompanied by the reinforcement of responsible management review, a financial support from the government would be necessary if it is difficult in reality to raise the guarantee rate (in the case of credit guarantee) or allow an interest rate premium (in the case of policy fund loan).