2007∼2009년 금융위기 시 연방준비은행의 증권사에 대한 최종대부자 기능과 그 시사점

This paper suggested the policy implication for stabilizing the financial system against the crisis of the capital market in Korea, analyzing the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) by which the Federal Reserve (Fed) as a lender of last resort (LLR) supplied liquidity to the primary dealers during the financial crisis of 2007∼2009. The two facilities, TSLF and PDCF, are effective in stabilizing the financial system by giving liquidity to the primary dealers in emergency. As a whole, Fed are evaluated to have executed the appropriate policy though they might give rise to the primary dealer’s moral hazard a little bit. The factors which enabled the policy to stabilize the financial system are as follows: First, the institutional system are already established to support the Fed’s action as a lender of last resort, including the Federal Reserve Act. Second, Fed had the attitude and capability of advancing the legally proper process for making the policy. Third, Fed executed the policy suitable for solving the problem of the capital market in crisis. Especially, TSLF were more effective. Last, the coordination with the Treasury and SEC also contributed to Fed’s active execution. However, among the Fed policy for stabilizing financial system during year 2007∼2009, the rescue program for the specific private financial company such as AIG is blamed to make financial companies’ moral hazard worse and then aggravate financial fragility in the long run. It gives a point of dispute how to apply to Bagehot’s rule in reality, which central bank should keep as a lender of last resort. Considering the magnitude and aggregate risk level of capital market, the financial crisis starting from capital market may happen in Korea. Therefore, Bank of Korea (BOK) and other government organization should prepare for this new type of financial crisis with active attitude and revise the public system for stabilizing financial market in advance. Based on the lesson of Fed case, this paper suggested the two measures for advancing the system. First, more favorable condition should be established for BOK’s LLR function by way of revision of BOK Act. The execution condition for BOL’s emergency loan should be revised, by prescribing the condition as the situation in financial system risk or expected to happen financial system risk. Also, for protecting from external pressure for emergency loans, the principle for emergency loans which reflect bagehot’s rule should be inserted in BOK Act. Second, as BOK has no financial supervisory authority, the cooperation with financial supervisory agencies and Treasury Department is important. This paper suggested that the council between BOK and Financial Supervisory Services should be established in practical level. In addition, it suggested that the so called Financial Stability Council, which many academic studies advised to establish as a coordination mechanism for financial system stabilization policy among diverse financial supervisory agencies including BOK, should coordinate the activities of agencies and BOK related with emergency loans. Also, it need to be considered that BOK has more inspection authority on only the financial companies which borrowed the emergency loans from BOK.