은산분리의 실증분석: 은행과 산업의 결합에 따른 비용-편익의 추정을 중심으로

The purpose of this article is to empirically analyze the cost-benefit results of the combination of banking and commerce, and to evaluate the performance of separation of banking and commerce as a public policy. Separation of banking and commerce is a financial regulatory policy that must be supported by cost-benefit analysis. Separation of banking and commerce aims to ensure bank’s efficient credit allocation, soundness, fiduciary duty to depositors and investors, and stability of the financial system. Meanwhile, it is argued that the combination of banking and commerce is necessary for new entry of industrial capital into the financial market, and for the promotion of competition and innovation. The cost of the combination could be the reason for the favor of the separation, while the benefits of the combination could be the reason for opposition to the separation. In reality, the costs and benefits may appear at the same time. Accordingly, it is required to empirically judge the relative sizes of costs and benefits. The cost-benefit of the combination can be estimated through analysis of the effects of ownership and control of banks by industrial capital on the financial performances and default risks of both large corporations and banks. The effect of ownership of banks by industrial capital on the performances and default risks can be referred to as the ownership effect, and the effect of control can be referred to as the controlling effect. Ownership and control are different. Without a rigorous distinction between ownership and control, it may be difficult to make an accurate assessment of the cost-benefit of the combinations of banking and commerce. If banking failure is caused by ownership itself, the ownership of bank by industrial capital should be completely banned, but if banking failure is caused by the control, it would be a reasonable policy measure to allow ownership but apply strict corporate governance regulation. In order to analyze the cost-benefit analysis of the combination of banking and industry, this paper analyze the banks and industrial firms during the period of 1993-2006. Although the ownership and control of finance by industrial firms was not limited to banks, this paper limits the subject of analysis to banks. Before the financial crisis 1997-1998, the scope of the combination of finance and industrial firms in Korea was very wide and deep. The targets of the consolidation included not only banks, but also financial investment banks, insurance companies, and securities companies, and the consolidation led many of them to bankruptcy during the financial crisis. The crisis of 1997-1998 was also evaluated overseas. William Seidman, the chairman of the US FDIC (1985-1991), at the FDIC symposium held in 2003, said that the bankruptcy of Korean banks during the Asian financial crisis was a disaster created by “so-called the mixing of commerce and finance.” It was said that crony capitalism resulting from the combination of finance and commerce violated the principle of efficient credit allocation and, as a result, led to bank bankruptcy and the financial crisis. According to the Comprehensive Report on Financial Reform (CRFR) by the Korean Financial Reform Committee in 1997, the “combination of financial capital and industrial capital” led to the emergence of a large corporate group with concentration of economic power that caused unfair transactions, distortions of credit allocation, and conflicts of interest. The public safety net such as the deposit insurance system and the lender of last resort function of the central bank were misused for the private interests of the large company, and the soundness and stability of the banking system were seriously damaged. The financial supervision was incapacitated due to the deepening of information asymmetry caused by the consolidation. Overall the combination caused serious inefficiency in the financial market and economy. The empirical analysis of this paper used Logit and OLS estimation methodologies, and the following results were obtained. First, the combination of finance and commerce created cost-benefit asymmetrically between banks and large corporations. Most of the large corporations with the status as large shareholders of banks avoided bankruptcy, while most of the banks, where large corporations were large shareholders, went bankrupt. However, there were some cases that not only did they avoid bankruptcy, but also showed the best financial performance although large corporations were the major shareholders. According to this result, the ownership of bank by large corporations itself might not be the necessary cause of the bank's failure. Second, it was revealed that the result of asymmetric cost-benefit between banks and large corporations was caused by the control effect rather than the ownership effect. Therefore, combining two results, it could be said that large corporation’s ownership of bank did not necessarily produce bank failures unless they de facto controlled the banks. The policy implication of these results for the separation policy of banking and commerce is that the separation policy should have been promoted centering on corporate governance regulation rather than ownership regulation, and the ownership regulation should have been used to complement the corporate governance regulation.