과점주주 취득세의 문제점 및 개선방안: 과점주주 구성원 변경 문제를 중심으로

The acquisition tax oligopolistic shareholder system is said to have introduced a deemed acquisition tax for oligopolistic shareholders in order to prevent corporate shareholders from avoiding tax burden even though they have substantial ownership. In this study, we would like to consider how it is desirable to establish the scope of the tax evasion and oligopolistic shareholders as a way to prevent such tax evasion of oligopolistic shareholders. In particular, if it is determined to meet the requirements of oligopolistic shareholders based on the criteria of standard shareholders presented in the interpretation of administrative voters, it is intended to examine the problems and improvement measures. The current oligopolistic shareholder system designed the system for additional acquisition tax on oligopolistic shareholders depending on the actual change in control, but if a tax avoidance plan is established for tax avoidance, the taxation itself may not be possible. If the composition of oligopolistic shareholders is changed to transfer practical control, it is desirable to impose an oligopolistic shareholder acquisition tax in terms of real taxation and taxation equity. The current local tax oligopolistic shareholder's commemoration is so comprehensively broad that oligopolistic shareholders can continue to dominate depending on who they are, which makes it necessary to clarify the concept and judgment requirements for oligopolistic shareholders. The method proposed in this study is desirable to base the judgment of the reference shareholder on the basis of the largest shareholder, and additional administrative interpretations are needed to interface with the real control of the largest shareholder. This study presents problems related to the judgment of oligopolistic shareholders, and we hope that more institutional studies will find completed legislative alternatives in the future.