보상위원회의 설치가 경영자의 능력에 미치는 영향

[Purpose] This study investigates whether the establishment and reasonable operation of the Compensation Committee have the effect of motivating managers to match the wealth of shareholders by mitigating the agency problem. [Methodlogy] The management ability is measured by using the DEA(Data Envelopment Analysis) to calculate the relative efficiency of the companies in the same industry, and measured separately by the efficiency attributable to the management ability using the Tobit regression. [Findings] We find that adopting compensation committee is positively associated with managerial ability. This can be interpreted as having the effect of motivating the establishment of a compensation committee to use the manager’s ability differently. We also find that the ratio of outside directors representing the independence of the Compensation Committee is positively associated with managerial ability for firms. This is interpreted as the higher the ratio of outside directors of the Compensation Committee, the greater the effect of motivating managers. In contrast, the action of the Compensation Committee had no significant impact on the ability of management. [Implications] These findings suggest that the establishment and reasonable operation of the Compensation Committee has the effect of mitigating agent problem between shareholders and managers, ultimately increasing corporate value. Furthermore, it is expected that reasonable operation of the Compensation Committee will help investors make decisions as a yardstick for sound governance, suggesting that it can contribute to maximizing shareholder value by preventing inefficient allocation of resources.