신자유주의 시대 미국 재산권 제도와 그 위기 자산유동화증권 시장의 재산관계를 중심으로

The purpose of this paper is, focusing on the US property rights system and its changes, to analyze the conditions of resource allocation in the capital market, which spread in the neoliberal era, and the conditions of socioeconomic uncertainty after the 2008 economic crisis. This analysis can help to clarify what were the historical and institutional conditions that structured the unique circulation and distribution of resources in the neoliberal era. The concept of property rights as an investment backed expectation and the rules of property relations resulting from it were the basis for establishing the dominance of capital market relations in the neoliberal era. Under the premise of normal capital market operation, the parties to private transactions were guaranteed to form a relationship that, according to their calculations, transfers the risks arising from the property and divides the flow of profits. While more people have access to the opportunities and benefits that come from certain properties, this institutions of property rights had systematic weaknesses. The complexities of this relationship are difficult to fully understand, or groups in positions of weakness have had to take the risk. Furthermore, the uncertainty and information gap caused by the expansion of the fragmented property rights world created social costs by transferring risks to the entire system. The system of property rights acted as a force to structure systematic inequality in the process of circulating resources and funds and creating or allocating opportunities and costs. It can be said that this relationship of wealth was underpinned by income and asset inequality, which was prominent in the neoliberal era. The 2008 global economic crisis and mortgage borrowers’s inability to repay, which triggered the crisis, revealed the weakness of the property rights system in the neoliberal era. As the assumption of normal capital market operation ceased to be effective, property rights conflicts and disputes among actors increased, and it was showed that private actors themselves did not have the mediation ability to restore property relations. While institutions’ attempts to alleviate this instability contributed to preventing the deepening of the crisis, they conflicted with the principles of the neoliberal property rights system. Private actors have found it difficult to seize the opportunities and risks that public intervention changes by referring to property rules that have persisted over the past decades. This uncertainty and unpredictability is the source of the continuing instability of the property rights system.