차별적 성과 보상제도가 기술선도형 기업의 재무적 성과에 미치는 영향

This study investigates the effects of discriminative executive stock options, employee stock ownership plan and performance-based salary system adopted by Korean firms to enhance their productivity and financial performance. We use 113,624 firm-level survey and financial data of 17,166 firms provided by MicroData Integrated Service (MDIS) of the Korean Bureau of Statistics (BOS) from 2006 to 2017. We find that stock options have negative effects on ROA of firms especially for those not adopting so-called the fourth industrial revolution technology when they grant stock options for CEO, executives and some employees, while such effects are not statistically significant for the non-innovative technology firms when they grant stock options to all employees and for the innovative technology firms for all cases, that stock ownership has negative effects on return on assets (ROA) of firms especially in both innovative and non-innovative technology groups when they grant stocks widely to some employees and all employees, while such effects are not statistically significant for both groups when stocks are provided to only CEO and executives, and that the performance based incentive system also invokes very serious negative effects of on ROA of firms especially for the non-innovative technology firm group when they adopt such program for any or all portion of their executives or employees, while such negative effects are observable in the innovative technology firm group when they adopt such program only for all of their employees. The results prove that incentive schemes adopted by Korean firms mostly play a pretty negative role as a ‘hygiene factor’, aggravating financial performance rather than improving them as a ‘positive motivation factor’ especially for those non-innovative technology firms, relatively worse in profitability, smaller in size and lagged in adopting so-called the-fourth-industrial revolution technology.