복수 최고경영자 간 파워갭이 주가폭락에 미치는 영향

[Purpose] The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between the power gap among Co－CEOs and the stock price crash within a company that has appointed multiple CEOs. In other words, I analyze the effect of the difference in influence among Co－CEOs within a company due to the difference in tenure and stock ownership on the risk of a stock price crash. [Methodology] The stock price crash is measured using the measurements(NCSKEW, DUVOL) introduced in Kim et al. (2011), and the power gap between Co－CEOs is measured through the difference in tenure and the difference in the percentage of shares owned. Through OLS regression analysis, the relationship between the power gap between Co－CEOs and the possibility of stock price crash was analyzed, and cluster standard errors regression analysis was performed as a robustness test. [Findings] First, when power gap was measured by the difference in tenure, it was found to have a positive (＋) relationship with the stock price crash. Second, when the power gap was measured using the percentage of shares owned, it was also shown that the stock price crash had a positive (＋) relationship. This is interpreted as a result of the fact that the greater the power gap between Co－CEOs, the more the mutual monitoring function does not function properly, and the opportunistic decision－making of the CEO with greater power cannot be prevented in advance. [Implications] This study has the following contribution in addition to prior literature that analyzed the effect of the Co－CEO structure. Most of the previous studies analyzed only the effect of the Co－CEO structure itself, but in addition, this study presents the results of an empirical analysis on the effect of the power gap between Co－CEOs on internal decision－making within the company.