프랜차이즈의 성공적 운영을 위한 계약 메커니즘에 대한 연구: 관계적 계약과 공식적 계약이 파트너십과 가맹점성과에 미치는 영향

Most of the research on the relationship or channel performance between the franchise headquarters and the distribution channel control structure and channel performance was conducted in advance, and there was no comprehensive study on the impact of relational norms on opportunistic behavior and contract compliance. This study examined and analyzed which contract mechanisms of franchise headquarters for long-term relationship between franchise headquarters and franchisee for shared growth increase partnership of opportunistic behavior and contract compliance behavior. Specifically, the detailed variables from a formal contract perspective and the impact of each detail from a relational exchange perspective on opportunistic behavior and the contract compliance are analyzed and the impact it leads to long-term performance of the franchisee. It also examined to reveal whether Franchisee's confidence in Franchise headquarters plays a controlling role in opportunistic behavior and long-term performance of franchisee. Hypothesis 1 is that flexibility, information exchange, and collegiate problem-solving in a relational contract will have a positive effect on contract compliance behavior (Hypothesis 1a, 1b, 1c). And, the contractual specification, contract violations regulations, and extra-contractual incentives would have a positive effect on contract compliance behavior (Hypothesis 2a, 2b, 2c). Hypothesis 3 is a hypothesis about the impact of relational contracts on opportunistic behavior, which hypothesizes that flexibility, information exchange, and collegiate problem-solving in relational contracts will have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior (Hypothesis 3a, 3b, 3c). Hypothesis 4 is that the contractual specification, contract violations regulations, and extra-contractual incentives will have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior (Hypothesis 4a, 4b, 4c). Next, hypothesis 5 was established that contract compliance behavior would have a positive effect on the franchisee’s long-term performance and hypothesis 6 was that the opportunistic behavior would have a negative effect on the franchisee’s long-term performance. Finally, Hypothesis 7 was established that trust in the franchise headquarters of franchisee will play a controlling role between the opportunistic behavior and the long-term performance of franchisees. To verify the established research theory and research model, the first 305 questionnaires were distributed to franchisees located in Daegu and North Gyeongsang Province, and 217 questionnaires were retrieved, and 153 questions recorded as valid answers were finally used for analysis. Verifiable factor analysis shows that the model fit is χ2=1177.029, df=726, χ2/df=1.621, and the other goodness-of-fit index, IFI=.938, TLI=.929, CFI=.937 indicates overall good. Furthermore, the mean variance extraction (AVE) is greater than 0.50 for all variables and the synthetic reliability (CR) value calculated as the value of standardized factor load and error variance is more than 0.70, indicating that concentration validity is obtained. Correlation analysis was performed on scales with proven concentration validity to evaluate law validity and discriminant validity. The analysis showed that the direction of the hypothesis and the direction of the correlation coefficient set in the study matched the law validity, and that the AVE square root of all latent variables was greater than the correlation coefficient, confirming that the discrimination validity between theoretical variables was also obtained. The verification results of the hypothesis are as Table 2~3. First, the 1a hypothesis that the flexibility would have a positive effect on contract compliance behavior was rejected. However, information exchange and collegiate problem-solving have a significant impact on contract compliance behavior, supported hypotheses 1b and 1c, and that relational contracts will consequently affect contract compliance behavior. Hypotheses 2a and 2c were then supported, as the contractual specification and contract violations regulations, among the effects of the formal contract on the contract compliance behavior. However, the 2b hypothesis that extra-contractual incentives would affect contract compliance behavior was not statistically significant, and the hypothesis that formal contracts would affect contract compliance behavior was partially supported. Third, for the influence of relational contracts on opportunistic behavior, only information exchange was found to have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior with significant statistical implications, and only the hypothesis of 3b was supported. Flexibility and collegiate problem-solving by the Franchise Headquarters were not statistically significant, and hypotheses 3a and 3c were rejected, and the hypothesis that relational contracts would have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior was partially supported. Hypothesis 4a was supported by hypothesis 4a as it was found that only the contractual specification had a negative effect with statistically meaningful outcome values. contract violations regulations, and extra-contractual incentives were not statistically significant and hypotheses 4b and 4c were rejected. Consequently, the hypothesis that formal contracts would have a negative effect on opportunistic behavior was partially supported. In the relationship between partnership and franchisee’s performance, hypothesis 5 and hypothesis 6 were both supported by the franchisee’s performance, “The contract compliance behavior will have positive (+) effect on franchisee’s performance” and “opportunistic behavior will have negative effect on franchisee’s performance”. Finally, it has become clear that Franchisee’s confidence in franchise headquarters has the effect of reducing the negative impact of franchisee’s opportunistic behavior on franchisee’s performance.