Effect of CEO-executive Connections on Earnings Management and Detection

While the top management team is important in shaping the overall governance within the firm, there is limited research on how top management team relationships affect earnings management decisions. This study uses connections between the CEO and the top non-CEO executives to examine whether having previously formed relationships affect their earnings management activities and detection thereof. Using 6,582 S&P 1500 firms in the U.S. from 1999 to 2013, I find that as the percentage of executives with connections to the CEO increases, so do discretionary accruals. In contrast I do not find any association between connections and real earnings management. I also find that the greater the percentage of executives with connections to the CEO, the less likely accounting manipulation will be detected. This study should be useful to regulators and standard setters who are interested in assessing the likelihood of the firm engaging in accounting manipulations as this study documents that connections between the CEO and the non-CEO executives is an important determinant.