내부감시기구 특성과 감사위원회 활동성에 대한 지배주주의 조절효과

[Purpose] The purpose of this study is to verify the relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and audit committee and audit committee activity, and then to examine how this relationship is changed by the interests of the controlling shareholders confirmed through audit committee activity. [Methodology] The multiple regression models were used to verify the effect of the characteristics of the internal audit organization and the controlling shareholder’s interest on the activity of the audit committee. [Findings] While there is a significant and positive relationship between board size as well as its meeting frequency and audit committee activity, audit committee expertise positively affect audit committee activity. The board and audit committee independence have not a significant relationship with audit committee activity. These results suggest that the greater the board size and meeting frequency, the more active information sharing on corporate management promotes the monitoring activities of the audit committee. Audit committee independence and expertise are not determinants that trigger the monitoring activities of the audit committee. The audit committee activity is high in the section where the controlling shareholder ratio is low, and is low in the section where the controlling shareholder ownership ratio is high. Furthermore, the positive relationship between board activity and audit committee activity is strengthened in the section with a high percentage of controlling shareholders. Therefore, the positive interaction between internal monitoring bodies occurs when the opportunistic incentives of controlling shareholders are low. [Policy Implications] This study implies that an institutional safeguard is needed to control the influence of the controlling shareholders on internal monitoring bodies.