최대주주와 벤처캐피탈의 상호 관계가 IPO 저평가 및 투자회수에 미치는 영향 분석

This study explored if the ownership structure between VCs and owners impacts on IPO underpricing, offering size and VCs exit strategy. Particularly, it examined the relation in more detail when VC’s exit can be crucial to owners’ controlling power after IPO. We analyzed a total of 220 IPO firms listed in KOSDAQ Market from year 2008 to year 2013 and found that 61.8%(136 firms) of the firms were backed by VCs, of which 85.3% withdrawed their investments within 3 months afer IPOs, which means that IPOs function as a VCs exit strategy. Secondly, it showed that the extent of IPO underpricing was larger with both the intermediate levels of owners’ ownersip and VCs backed, which implies that the desire of VCs to underprice IPOs and increase liquidity is more powerful than that of owners control retention. Lastly, as the extent of VCs holdings is larger, exit at once is less attractive. This result doesn’t support the hypothesis that VCs prefer the stagged exit with the intermediate levels of owners ownersip, predicting the stock price would fall as market consider VCs exit as the absence of external auditors. This study has the significance in that this is the first paper in Korea to explore the dynamic relation between VCs and control retention of owners and its impact on IPO process and VCs exit strategy.