조약문의 ‘通常的 意味’에 대한말뭉치 언어학의 접근방법

The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has repeatedly stated that the customaryrules of treaty interpretation are reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Viena Conventionon the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”). Article 31 of the VCLT, inter alia, provides to the efectthat a treaty shal be interpreted in god faith in acordance with the ordinary meaningto be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object andpurpose unles a special meaning shal be given to a term. In Immunites and CriminalProcedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France) case, the ICJ finds, by a bare majority, that theprovisions of the Viena Convention on Diplomatic Relations (“VCDR”), in theirordinary meaning, are of litle asistance in determining the circumstances in which aproperty acquires the status of “premises of the mision”. This sems to sugest that theordinary meaning of the provisions of a treaty should be discerned in some objectiveway, not by a native speaker’s intuiton. The “ordinary meaning rule” has played aprominent role in statutory interpretation in the United States, and courts should asignto a statutory term its ordinary meaning unles that term is defined by the law. Overthe past decade, corpus linguistics has become a respected tol for statutory interpretation in the United States — one that provides an alternative to dictionaries. Given the objective character of corpus analysis for finding the ordinary meaning ofwords, it is submited that corpus linguistics would be a promising tol for treatyinterpretation as wel. Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languagescould be asisted by analyzing an apropriate comparable or paralel corpus, or both.