조세회피가 경영자 보상과 기업가치의 관계에 미치는 영향

[Purpose] Considering the manager’s ability in terms of the manager’s competency hypothesis, the higher the reward, the better the manager’s capability, and it can be seen that the firm value is increased by the manager’s motivation. However, in terms of the manager’s vested interests infringing hypothesis, it may have a negative effect on firm value due to maximization for manager’s private gain. This study intends to verify the relationship between management compensation and firm value in conjunction with the tax avoidance strategy proposed in previous studies as part of opportunistic behavior and agency problems. [Methodology] Tax Avoidance was measured using five－year data on the long－term cumulative effective corporate tax rate and the long－term cumulative effective corporate tax rate used in the studies of Ayers et al. (2009) and Dyreng et al. (2008) was measured using. And as the dependent variable, Firm Value, the value obtained by dividing the market capitalization at the end of the period by the total assets of the company was used. The research analysis period is from 2011 to 2017, and the analysis was conducted based on 1,872 (company/year) that satisfy some conditions among listed companies that are non－financial businesses and have a December settlement of accounts. [Findings] Management Compensation was found to have a significant positive (＋) effect on Firm Value. However, Tax Avoidance was found to have a significant negative (－) effect on Firm Value. The relationship between Management Compensation and Firm Value was also found to have a significant negative (－) effect. [Implications] Management Compensation can bring increase in firm value due to motivation, but it seems to have meaning in suggesting that it can decrease firm value due to pursuit of private profit such as tax avoidance, exploitation of personal funds, or opportunistic behavior.