플랫폼 사업의 경쟁법상 주요 쟁점에 관한 연구

Over 10,000 new platform companies have sprouted and mushroomed in less than a decade, and they continue to pop up daily. The platform economy is so diverse in its offerings that to neatly describe its scope is impractical. The staggering rise of online networks and digital service companies triggers questions about the nature of platform businesses. The platform is introducing new models and structures of exchange in unprecedented rates. Platform companies often have very few real assets, and their value is embedded in their technology, their user base, and their brand. There is an opportunity for a platform to increase social surplus when three necessary conditions are true: (1) there are distinct groups of customers; (2) a member of one group benefits from having his demand coordinated with one or more members of another group; and (3) anintermediary can facilitate that coordination more efficiently than bi-lateral relationships between the members of the group. The economics of multi-sided markets differs from the economics of single-sided markets in important respects. In the multi-sided platform markets, it is possible that the optimal price for one side will be less than the marginal cost for that side. Platform businesses may tend to skew prices towards one side or another depending upon the magnitude of the indirect network externalities resulting from that side. If side A generates a much greater degree of externalities for side B than side B does for side A, side A may tend to get a lower price. Market definition helps to determine whether the defendant has enough market power to engage in certain anticompetitive tactics and whether those tactics will result in an increase in or maintenance of its market power. Market definition in single-sided markets, however, must be used with special care when multisided platforms are involved. The pricing analysis must consider all sides of the market and their interactions. Market share as a proxy for market power is problematic in many circumstances but is especially so for businesses that compete in multisided platform markets. There is no necessary relationship between price and marginal cost on any side of multi-sided platform markets. To analyze market power from this situation, one has to examine whether the total price is significantly above total marginal costs.