공적연기금의 주주행동주의는 기업의 회계투명성을 제고하는가?

This study examines the impact of the National pension Service (NPS)'s shareholder activism on accounting transparency from 2011 to 2018. Our sample consists of Korean listed companies that are 5% or more owned by the NPS. The NPS's shareholder activism is measured by the interaction between ratio of the NPS's opposing voting rights and its ownership at the general shareholders' meeting. We measure accounting transparency as the quality of accruals. We find an evidence that the NPS's shareholder activism has the effect of improving accounting transparency. In addition, our study indicates that companies with a higher ratio of the NPS's opposition voting rights tend to have lower accounting transparency in the next fiscal year. The rationale for this result is as follows. The NPS exercises the right to vote against due to the characteristics or compensation for directors or auditors, which may impair accounting transparency. In spite of the NPS's opposing voting rights, it is very rare that the original proposal is finally rejected. For this reason, we speculate that accounting transparency will be impaired as the negative impact will be realized in the future. We conclude that the exercise of the NPS's opposing voting rights serves as a kind of signal to guard against negative corporate actions. With the introduction of the stewardship code in Korea, institutional investors should consider the direction of active shareholder activities. This study contributes to verifying the effect of the NPS's shareholder activism on accounting transparency.