비정상투자가 재무분석가 허딩에 미치는 영향

This study investigates whether abnormal investment affects financial analysts’ herding behavior. Abnormal investment caused by information asymmetry makes it difficult for general investors to estimate the future value of the entity and interpret the accounting information associated with those investments, which may increase demand for independent forecasts by financial analysts. On the other hand, information uncertainty and information risk exist for entities that have made abnormal investments, which requires greater effort and cost for financial analysts to produce independent forecasts. That is, in the presence of information risk, such as abnormal investments, whether the analyst increases or decreases the herding behavior depends on the supply and demand of the analyst forecast information. The empirical analysis provides evidence that the financial analysts’ herding behavior decreased as abnormal investment increased. An analysis of abnormal investment separately into over-investment and under-investment showed that this effect is significant only in over-investment. Further analysis shows that financial analysts' herding behavior decreased more when the risk of abnormal investments is high and when abnormal investments are accompanied with earnings management. This means that in the presence of abnormal investment, financial analysts reduce herding behavior and provide independent forecasts in response to the needs of information consumers (i.e. investors). This study contributes to the literature by showing that in the presence of information uncertainty and information risk, financial analysts faithfully perform their role as information intermediaries by providing high-quality forecast information to the market.