한국기업 사외이사 네트워크에서의 끊어진 연결 복구: 기업 엘리트집단, 자원의존, 조직학습 관점을 중심으로

Organizational theorists considered corporate boards as a means to maintain corporate elite network, manage a firm’s resource dependence on external environment and facilitate inter-organizational learning based on the board interlock. I consider these three major theoretical mechanisms underlying the evolution of Korean independent directorship since its adoption in 2002. The possibility of broken-tie-reconstitution has been examined in the three potential network areas, when the corporate elite network, resource dependence network, and board-interlock have been disrupted by the turnover of an independent director. The empirical analysis utilizing corporate board information of 1,382 Korean public companies between 2002 and 2011 reveals that interruption in terms of an independent director’s corporate elite and resource dependence networks tends to be restored soon by inviting a new independent director with similar elite or career background. On the contrary, tie reconstitution of a board interlock by an independent director is rarely observed since board interlock in Korea has been limited within a business-group via the exchange of executive directors. The result suggests that independent directorship in Korea has evolved mostly as a means of corporate elite community retention and resource dependence management, rather than a source of inter-organizational information transfer and learning.