중첩세대모형을 활용한 소득세, 출산지원 정책, 자녀 소득에 비례한 연금정책 조합의 효과 분석

This study presents an overlapping generations model to analyze decisions such as parents’ childbirth, education expenditure and lifetime consumption and analyzes the effects of the government’s childbirth, education support, and pension policy combination on population growth rate, high-income ratio, and intergenerational income mobility. Under the Pay-as-you-go (hereinafter referred to as PAYG) pension policy, parents’ choice of childbirth and education expenditure for their children have external effects. In addition, choices in each parent’s childbirth and education expenditure change the long-term demographic structure, when there is heterogeneity in the child’s educational efficiency, apart from the PAYG pension. Under these two types of externalities, government policy intervention is needed to induce parents’ choice to be the social choice. If the government cannot observe parents’ educational expenditures on their children, the government can instead provide parents with incentives to invest in their children by designing the pension they will receive to reflect their children’s total income. However, if parents have a risk aversion tendency, pension policies proportional to uncertain children’s income have a weaker effect of providing incentives to make investments in the optimal direction, than pension policies proportional to solid educational expenditures. In addition, if the implicit contract between parents and children is related to high fertility rates and low educational expenditures in the past traditional society, pension policies proportional to their total income can be expected to have similar effects. Accordingly, when implementing a pension policy proportional to the total income of children, there is a need to additionally adjust parents’ investment choices for children through childbirth policies so that they can be appropriately distributed to childbirth and education expenditures.