기업의 특성이 과잉투자와 미래이익반응계수간의 관계에 미치는 영향 : 사외이사, 감사위원회, 경영자의 특성을 중심으로

Although the results suggest that corporate investment leads to high performance, studies have shown that overinvested companies can negatively affect future performance in the long run as their profitability deteriorates and they bear excessive cash flows. This is because the investment activities of the entity are carried out not for the purpose of making an investment decision for the value of the entity but for the purpose of pursuing the management's own private interests. Kim and Kim(2021) suggest that overinvestment activities were for the benefit of individual managers rather than for the purpose of improving corporate value, and that stock prices did not reflect information on future earnings. Therefore, this study examines whether the market's interpretation of an entity's overinvestment depends on the outside directors, the audit committee, and the manager's characteristics, which are known to be able to efficiently control management's private profit-seeking. This is because companies with outside directors and audit committees can efficiently control management's private profit-seeking activities, and the quality of accounting information is different and future management performance is different. This study empirically examines the effect of company characteristics on relationship between overinvestmnet and future earnings response coefficient. our research results as follows. Future earnings response coefficient of the company with that have an outside director or an audit committee, or owner manager, or longer manager’s term, or superior manager ability is relatively higher than otherwise. These results imply that investors cannot reasonably predict the future profits of overinvest-companies, but that overinvestment in companies with stronger governance was aimed at increasing long-term corporate value by efficiently controlling managers' pursuit of private interests. The contribution of this study was that rather than simply examining investors' reactions to overinvestment, it was necessary to consider the characteristics of companies, the outside director, audit committee, and managers that can efficiently monitor and control opportunistic behavior of managers.