한국 상장기업의 재량적 이익조정 결정요인에 관한 연구: 경영자 교체 및 재무제약 요인이 미치는 영향의 실증적 분석

This paper intensively investigates whether management replacement affects agency problems while resulting in the upward or downward discretionary management of earnings around the time of management turnover. This paper also includes financial constraint measures as key possible determinants of discretionary earnings management in combination with management replacement. On the one hand, this paper provides consistent empirical findings that enforced management replacement possibly aggravates agency problem and increases discretionary earnings management in the subsample with positive discretionary earnings management. On the other hand, this paper also provides the findings that voluntary management replacement decreases discretionary earnings management possibly for the purpose of income smoothing in the subsample with negative discretionary earnings management. Overall, this paper shows that the management replacement, in combination with financial constraints, triggers management to seek for private benefits by either reporting overestimated income with positive discretionary earnings management or reporting underestimated income with negative discretionary earnings management for income smoothing.