清末 金融危機와 海關銀號의 倒産-天津의 津海關을 중심으로-

This study analyzed the process that the financial market crisis in the late Qing Dynasty threatened the stability of customs administration through the Jin Haiguan (津海關, a customs office) in Tianjin, China. The proxy tax collection structure of customs in the Qing Dynasty was a device to manage the costs and risks produced in the procedure of administration by the tax collection authorities. The tax collection contractors were guaranteed the right to operate customs duties in return for participating in the tax collection business. After the disintegration of the Canton system, the Qing Dynasty installed Customs banks, superseding the Hong merchants who were in charge of the tax collection contracting business during the early period. The tax collection was delegated to operators selected by the Superintendents. The late tax collection contracting business was led by Qianzhuang and Yin hao (錢莊, 銀號, traditional Chinese banking institutions), which were engaged in the conventional financial industry. As the Customs banks profited from loans and receipts based on the right to operate tax revenue, the financial market conditions significantly affected their profitability. The two financial crises in Tianjin in the 1900s distinctly implicated the adverse impact of market changes on the stability of the Customs banks’ tax collection structure. The first was damage to the Customs banks due to the deterioration of currency quality. As a result of the tax collection contractors taking on the risk of customs administration, the Qing Dynasty maintained stable tax revenue, while the profitability of the Customs banks was inevitably degraded. The second was the prospect of bankruptcy as the financial environment was aggravated. The Customs banks’ stability and profitability through managing considerable quantities of tax revenue through financial activities were destined to suffer a severe blow when market liquidity was restricted. The first crisis succeeded in early settlement through the active intervention of the Qing Dynasty. The local authorities normalized the currency quality, and the market immediately stabilized. However, the second crisis rendered the Qing dynasty unable to address due to the aftermath of the revolution, precipitating the collapse of the financial market in Tianjin. According to the nature of the financial market in the late Qing Dynasty based on the credit economy, the bankruptcies of financial institutions generated a chain reaction, and financial institutions that had direct or indirect claim-obligation relationship with a Customs bank A in Tianjin started to fail as well. Nonetheless, in the second crisis, the Qing Dynasty did not protect the Customs banks but instead reclaimed Liu Feng bank’s right to operate the Customs banks and transferred it to HSBC. Although the local government showed an active move to support the Customs banks in the unstable market situation, it was to thoroughly ensure the stability of the tax revenue administration. Under the circumstances where the possibility of A’s bankruptcy increased, the tax collection authority decided to replace the tax collection contractors rather than bear the risk. It was a typical coping mechanism of the bureaucracy, which prioritized the stability of customs administration.