재량적연구개발비 과대투자와 IPO 기업의 상장폐지: 감사인 유형에 따른 차별적 효과

Behavioral finance literature points out that managers' psychological convenience can influence firm value by inducing inefficient decision-making. This study examines whether the manager's over-investment in R&D at the time of IPO is likely to be the manager's optimistic over-investment from two aspects. First, we examine whether firms with high discretionary R&D expenditures in the IPO year are more delisted after IPO. Second, we also examine whether the positive relationship between discretionary R&D expenditures and delisting in the IPO year differs depending on the auditor type. The results of analyzing and selecting 999 IPO firms newly listed on the KOSDAQ market from 2001 to 2015 as a sample are summarized as follows. First, we find that firms that overspent discretionary R&D expenditure in the IPO year is delisted more than other firms. These results suggest that discretionary R&D expenditure in the IPO year partially reflect the over-optimism of management. Second, firms contracting with Non-Big4 auditors in the IPO year show a positive relationship between discretionary R&D expenditures and delisting. However, firms contracted with Big4 auditors do not show a significant relationship. These results suggest that Big4 auditors have a greater monitoring effect than Non-Big4 auditors in suppressing the over-optimism of IPO firms. Overall, the results of this study suggest that IPO firms with weak external monitoring are likely to be in financial trouble due to risky investment propensity caused by manager's overconfidence and optimism.