경영자 초과보상이 퇴직연금적립수준에 미치는 영향

Many previous studies have overlooked the fact that safeguards that reduce managerial opportunistic behaviors can increase pension funding levels. There has been no study on the effect of managers’ compensation levels on pension funding levels. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the easing of managerial opportunism raises pension funding levels by examining the relationship between managers’ excess compensation and pension funding levels. The study shows that there is a significant and positive relationship between managers’ compensation and pension funding levels. This result indicates that managers who receive a lot of compensation are relatively active in raising pension funding level by reducing the opportunistic incentives associated with the use of cash. There is also a significant and positive relationship between managers’ excess compensation and compliance with the pension funding regulations. This result shows that managers, whose high compensation reduce opportunistic incentives, are more likely to comply with external regulations. This study contributes to the previous study by showing new evidence that managers’ excess compensation determines the pension funding level. This study also shows that the rational compensation system of managers can affect the welfare of employees. It suggests that policy makers need to provide reasonable compensation guidelines to alleviate managerial opportunism and to seek incentives to raise pension funding levels.