소멸시효의 중단사유로서 채무승인에 관한 시론적 고찰-미국 소멸시효법에서의 시사점

A statute of limitations is an arbitrary period of time within which an action must be commenced. If a claim is not brought within the time provided, a defendant may assert the statute as a defense. “Article 2 of the CPLR contains the principal statutes of limitations in New York, though there are many others.” The CPLR also includes two rules of general applicability, which are essential for analyzing statutes of limitations cases. The first rule, CPLR 203(a), states that “[t]he time within which an action must be commenced, except as otherwise expressly prescribed, shall be computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed.” To determine if there is a time limit in an action, one must first determine which period set forth in CPLR 211-217 (or from another source) is relevant; then determine when the claim accrued; and finally, consider the effect of any applicable tolls or extensions. The second rule, CPLR 201, states that, “[n]o court shall extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action.” Thus, courts must often defer to the legislatures' judgment as written in the statute as to when a particular claim has expired. There are fundamental policy goals underlying statutes of limitations. These concerns include notions of fairness, repose, meritorious claims, stale evidence, and credibility. Repose seems to be the paramount policy consideration in New York. This emphasis means that, as applied, New York's statutes of limitations are often defendant-orientated. The general rule is that the statute starts to run when the wrong is committed, i.e., at the point where the right to sue is complete, regardless of whether the person wronged is aware of the fact. However, the legislature may postpone the accrual to the date of discovery. Gotay and Bazakos are legal and medical malpractice cases, respectively, where the Court of Appeals reversed lower court decisions denying defendants' motions to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. In both cases, the claims accrued. In Gotay, the plaintiff argued that the three-year time limitation was not applicable because of the doctrine of continuous representation.24 The Appellate Division for the First Department found the doctrine to be applicable, but it was reversed by the Court of Appeals. In Bazakos, the plaintiff's claim was commenced two-years and eleven months after it accrued. The defendant moved to dismiss the case on the ground that it was barred by the two-year and six-month statute of limitations. The plaintiff argued the claim was governed by a three-year general negligence statute, and was, therefore, timely. The Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion, relying on an Appellate Division, Second Department decision, Evangelista v. Zolan. When the plaintiff appealed, the Appellate Division overruled Evangelista and reversed the Supreme Court, holding that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed, agreeing with the dissenting Justices in the Appellate Division, and barred the plaintiff's claim as untimely.