외부감사인과 내부 감사기구 간의 의사소통이 신용등급 불일치에 미치는 영향

[Purpose]The new External Audit Act introduced in 2018 emphasizes communication between the external auditor and internal audit organizations (audit or audit committee) to improve the quality of financial reporting. In this regard, prior studies have reported that the communication activities of corporate governance increase the audit quality, thereby improving the quality of accounting reports. This study focuses on the information asymmetry in the bond market and examines the effect of communication between external auditors and internal audit organizations on split ratings. [Methodology]The sample in this study is non－financial listed firms from 2014 to 2020, when listed firms reported communication activities. The degree of communication is measured by the number of communication between external auditors and those charged with governance in the ‘External Audit Implementation Details’ of the audit report. For split ratings, we use the credit rating information published by Korea Investors Service, NICE Investors Service, and Korea Ratings. [Finding]We find that the higher the frequency of communication between external auditors and internal audit organizations, the lower the likelihood of split ratings. Therefore, we suggest if the external auditors actively communicate with the internal audit organizations during the audit process, the quality of financial reporting will increase by providing high－quality audit services, and furthermore, information asymmetry in the bond market will reduce. [Implication]This study presents empirical evidence for the role of communication between external auditors and the governance in terms of information asymmetry in the bond market. Based on this, we provide implications for the establishment and implementation of policies by the supervisory authority to alleviate information asymmetry from a policy perspective.