차등의결권 주식은 기업가치를 제고하는가?

In Korea, an important part of corporate-related policies after the 1997 financial crisis is corporate governance. Until recently, this issue has been constantly discussed as a core reform target. Despite the concerns, however, attempts by politicians and venture businesses to introduce Dual-Class Shares as a way to protect management rights and boost financing of venture companies have continued. Accordingly, it is believed that the time has come to closely examine whether the introduction of them has a meaningful effect on corporate value. Therefore, this study aims to make policy suggestions by reviewing previous studies related to them and corporate value and analyzing the impact of the introduction of them. To this end, we try to analyze the impact of the introduction of this system on Korean companies and the market by first examining domestic prior studies related to them, at least indirectly, and then analyzing the change in the value of foreign companies that actually introduced them. As a result, many say that the introduction of Dual-Class Shares negatively affects corporate value. In other words, unlike the claims of the government and venture associations to introduce a system that can grant them up to 10 voting rights per share to unlisted venture companies, the corporate value may decline as in many cases abroad. Accordingly, it is necessary to recognize the problem that general (small) shareholders may be placed at a relatively disadvantageous position when a company adopting this system goes public.