지식재산 보호 체제 형성에 대한 내생적 균형

Purpose This study studies the conditions for the endogenous intellectual property protection(IPP). Design/Methodology/Approach Based on the research and development (R&D) spillover model by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), the analytical framework of this study is set up. Findings For a given low IPP cost and large R&D spillover to make IPP highly efficient, instead of choosing “no use of the mechanism”, the firms optimally choose “use the mechanism”. In this situation, the profits is worse off, which is a clear case of prisoner’s dilemma. In contrast, for a given high IPP cost that makes IPP inefficient, each firm has an incentive to choose the strategy of “no use of the mechanism”. Research Implications Our finding does not support the public-generating a large volume of domestic IPP. In some countries, the government-supported policies to drive firms to create greater intellectual property rights have been widely established. If the polices reduce IPP costs, the distortion in producer surplus will be larger.