증권 불공정거래 조사 협조자에 대한 제재 감면 방안의 연구

Since securities frauds occur non-face-to-face and use fraudulent means, it is difficult for investors to recognize the damage, and it is difficult to detect the frauds. Furthermore, as securities frauds are being organized and covered up, the damage to investors is also increasing. To this end, it is necessary to induce cooperation in an investigation by granting certain benefits to cooperators of securities frauds investigations. Cooperation is not a system that induces criminals to reflect and reduces sanctions because they have done so. Cooperation could not be established after the administrative agency has secured a clear clue to the frauds and can conduct an investigation. Benefiting the cooperation could be a request to actively cooperate with the administrative agency by granting the benefit of sanctions reduction or exemption for acts that provide clues to securities frauds that would not have been detected and sanctioned without the cooperation of criminals. Suppose the financial authorities operate a whistleblowing system to diversify the recognition pathways of misconduct and relieve the level of sanctions through settlement for investigation cooperators. In that case, violators would be encouraged to cooperate with the investigation. If they cooperate, a settlement could be made on generous terms, and sanctions could be waived if cooperation is high. On the other hand, if violators do not cooperate promptly, the accomplice might cooperate, or the whistleblower could provide a clue about securities frauds. In this study, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, hereinafter referred to as the ‘SEC’) adopts a cooperation program to prevent securities frauds rather than a leniency system under the Competition Act. The SEC is efficiently investigating securities frauds with the cooperation of the suspects of those who know the whole story of the securities frauds and, in return, grants the benefit of sanctions reduction or exemption. Even if a few criminals participated in the same securities frauds, the level of sanctions might differ depending on the cooperation degree. In order to introduce the cooperation system to the securities frauds investigation, it is necessary to secure the clarity of the system operation standards. The potential suspect decides whether to cooperate with the investigation after considering how much sanctions can be reduced or exempted by cooperation. In order to introduce the cooperation system, this study would like to suggest specific standards of cooperation.