전환경제하의 지배주주의 터널링과 최고경영자 교체 간의 관계 : 법 제도 개혁과 지배주주 정체성의 영향

The purpose of this study is to investigate how controlling shareholders’ tunneling, which is a major form of the principal-principal conflict, influences CEO turnover in a transition economy. Drawing on the agency theory, strategic leadership literature, and institutional logics perspective, this research examines the relationship between controlling shareholders’ tunneling and CEO turnover. Furthermore, this study investigates the effect of legal institutional reform (“the split share structure reform”) and controlling shareholders’ identity on the proposed main relationship. The empirical analysis is based on data spanning 13 years on 2,228 listed firms in China. Time-series logistic regression with random effect is used to test the hypotheses. We find that tunneling results in CEO turnover. The underlying mechanism of this relationship is that tunneling increases the conflict between controlling shareholders and CEOs and decreases the value of CEOs’ job opportunity. Moreover, the relationship is more salient before the institutional reform when the institutional logic favored controlling shareholders. The effect is less likely to hold after the reform when the institutional logic increased the bargaining power of CEOs to controlling shareholders. In addition, we find that controlling shareholders’ state identity negatively moderates the positive relationship between controlling shareholders’ tunneling and CEO turnover after the reform. This research highlights that under PP conflict, CEOs’ interests are not always aligned with those of controlling shareholders. Thus, controlling shareholder tunneling can lead to CEO turnover in a transition economy. In addition, this research shows that institutional reform can alleviate the positive effect of tunneling on CEO turnover. Furthermore, when controlling shareholders’ identity is aligned with state logic, institutional logic change has a larger effect on principals and agents in listed firms of China.