임원의 전문성이 주가 정보 속도에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구

This study attempted to analyze the effect of the expertise of corporate executives on stock price delay to information, based on the relationship that capital market efficiency hinges on information quality and executive characteristics influence the information process. Quality accounting information companies provide effectively alleviates information asymmetry in the stock market and reduce stock price delay. As executives involve in decision-making for accounting choices, executives ‘individual characteristics affect the quality of accounting information. Executives’ role in the information process of the stock market suggests that the information quality may vary depending on the characteristics of individual executives. Therefore, we empirically analyze the effect of executives’ personal expertise on the efficiency of the stock price information process measured by stock price delay. We measure the characteristics of executive expertise by the executive tenure, the percentage of full-time executives, concurrent positions of executives and employees of affiliated companies, and the presence of a doctoral degree. We select the expertise measures as follows. First, the longer the executive’s tenure, the more firm-specific experience and knowledge accumulates, and the better the understanding of the business. Second, since full-time executives spend a longer time for the company than part-time executives, they have more information about the firm’s operation than part-time executives. Third, if an executive concurrently serves as an employee (or an executive) of affiliates, the relationship among the affiliated companies facilitates a knowledge spillover. Finally, executives ‘educational level demonstrates the professional knowledge they deliver to the stock market and their information processing ability. We use stock price delay to information as a proxy to measure information efficiency. This study investigates the individual characteristics of executives that may affect the quality of corporate information, while previous literature has sought to find the determinants of stock price delay in the financial characteristics of the firm, such as stock price volatility and the quality of accounting information. In addition, this study examines both inside and outside directors focusing on executives’ personal characteristics, while previous research on executives focuses primarily on the independence of outside directors because of the data unavailability. This study selects observations from KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed companies from 2018 to 2020, excluding financial companies. Stock price delay as a proxy for market efficiency is measured following Hou and Moskowitz (2005). We find that all four executive expertise measures negatively correlate with stock price delay. The empirical analysis shows that executives’ expertise decreases stock price delay significantly. The longer the average tenure of executives or the higher the ratio of full-time executives, the lower the stock price delay. The existence of executives with doctoral degrees or executives concurrently serving as executives or employees of affiliated companies decreases the stock price delay. The results are robust when we extend the analysis period or use the alternative stock price delay measure, even after controlling for the effect of the largest shareholder executive or correlations between expertise measures. These results suggest that the more specialized the executives are, the faster the company information is reflected in the stock market, and the information efficiency can be improved. Our study contributes to the literature on determinants of capital market efficiency by showing that the expertise of individual executives affects the quality of the stock market information. This research highlights the importance of non-financial information in investment decisions by exploring the effects of factors other than accounting numbers on capital markets. We expect that the empirical evidence of this study will be useful information when companies establish policies and strategies for managing executives and boards of directors.