계열사 신규상장여부와 시장유형에 따른 기업집단 지배구조의 복잡성과 터널링의 관련성

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate group’s governance structure on tunneling with its affiliate’s IPO and market type of IPO. In the case of a group of firms in South Korea, the most major shareholder serve as CEO and control the entire group. Therefore, the perspective of the traditional agency theory, which focuses on the agency problem between shareholders and CEO, cannot accurately describe the agency costs of the group in South Korea. For accurate analysis, it needs to focus the agency problem that may arise between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Without understanding the corporate group governance structure, information asymmetry between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders may increase and controlling shareholder’s pursuing private benefits is difficult to be restricted. For this reason, as corporate group governance structure becomes more complex, tunneling may also increase. On the other hand, if the activities of controlling shareholder are accurately monitored by a robust monitoring system, tunneling may decrease. Thus, this study analyze the effect of complexity of corporate governance group structure on tunneling and whether the effect may differ by its affiliate’s IPO or market type of IPO. Through this analysis, it verifies the effect of complexity of corporate group governance structure on tunneling and the restriction effect of a robust monitoring system of the capital market. The results of the study are as follows: Tunneling increases as corporate group governance structure becomes more complex and is accelerated by listing its affiliates on KONEX market. This result suggests that controlling shareholder pursues private benefits by using asymmetric information and for this purpose, KONEX market, which has a relatively insufficient monitoring system, can be used as a means for tunneling.