CEO Overconfidence, Analyst Coverage, and Earnings Management

[Purpose]This paper investigates the relationships among CEO overconfidence, analyst coverage, and earnings management. [Methodology]In a research sample of 11,891 firm－year observations from 2010 to 2017 of A－share listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, we use the comprehensive index to measure CEO overconfidence, and employ the Jones model and modified Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals and measure earnings management. All data are collected from the CSMAR database. [Findings]We find that CEO overconfidence has a significant positive impact on earnings management, and that this impact is attenuated by analyst coverage. Furthermore, we find that CEO overconfidence in state－owned enterprises has no significant impact on earnings management, but in non－state－owned enterprises, it has a significant positive impact. [Implications]Our research results enhance our understanding of emerging markets and provide references for corporate managers and government regulatory policy makers.