프랜차이즈 시스템에서 관계특유투자와 계약상 안전장치 조항이 두 가지 전환비용과 계약이행 그리고 가맹점성과에 미치는 영향

Even in the COVID-19 situation, franchise industry in South Korea continues to grow quantitatively. but many problems are still being raised in terms of franchise system quality such as lack of communication and trust between franchise headquarters and franchisees. From a long-term perspective, it is very important to acquire a competitive relationship quality between the franchisee and the franchisee in order to improve the productivity of the franchise system. Therefore, in this study, for the qualitative growth of the franchise system, the franchise system is understood from the perspective of a long-term exchange and the quality of the relationship for the development of the franchise relationship is studied. To this end, this study examines the effect of the franchisor and franchisees’ relationship-specific investment(RSI) and the effect of the safeguarding clauses on franchisees’ switching costs on franchise performance through contract performance intention. In this study, relationship-specific investments in which mutual investment is made were used as prior variables, and the effect on the switching cost of franchises along with the safeguarding clauses for franchises was studied. In addition, the effect of these switching costs on franchise performance through contract compliance was studied. As a result of the study, both the affiliated franchisor and franchisee’s relationship-specific investment had a positive (+) effect on the franchisee’s financial and relational switching costs. In addition, the hypothesis (H3) on the effect of the safeguarding clauses on the financial switching cost and the relational switching cost was found to reduce the financial switching cost and increase the relational switching cost, consistent with the hypothesis setting direction. This suggests that setting a safeguarding clauses, a kind of protection for franchisees, can lower the financial switching cost of franchisees. by reducing the dependence of franchisees in inferior power, but can increase the relational switching cost by increasing the franchisee’s commitment. Hypothesis 4 of this study verified the effect of the type of switching cost on the contract compliance of franchisees. As a result of the study, it was found that the financial switching cost did not affect the contract compliance, but the relational switching cost had a positive (+) effect on the contract compliance. Moreover, this study suggests the importance of establishing relationship-specific investments and safeguarding clauses to establish relational switching costs for franchisees, as it was found to have a positive (+) effect on both their customers and financial performance.