국민연금의 반대의결권행사가 회계정보의 질에 미치는 영향: 이익반응계수를 중심으로

We investigate the effect of the National Pension Service(NPS)’s exercise of ‘no’ voting rights on earnings response coefficient. Specifically, it is intended to investigate whether the earnings response coefficient is influenced by the National Pension Service’s exercise of ‘no’ voting rights on agenda items related to the appointment of financial statements and board of directors, internal auditor, and audit committee members. Recently, the stewardship code has been introduced, emphasizing the importance of the role of institutional investors. At this point, we investigate whether the National Pension Service’s, known as Korea’s representative institutional investor, exercise of ‘no’ voting rights affects the earnings response coefficient. Our research results are as follows. First, when the National Pension Service exercised its right to vote against the agenda of the financial statements, earnings response coefficient is significantly decreased. In addition, this effect was stronger when the ownership by the National Pension Service exceeded 5%. Second, it was found that when the National Pension Service exercised its right to vote against the appointment of directors, internal auditor, and members of the audit committee, it did not have a significant effect on the company’s earnings response coefficient. However, in part, it was confirmed that the earnings response coefficient of the company was significantly decreased.