Christine M. Korsgaard의 규범성 해명에 대한 비판적 일 고찰

Christine M. Korsgaard attempted a reinterpretation of I. Kant’s philosophy in The Sources of Normativity. She distinguished between the categorical imperative and the moral law, and explained the establishment of normative demands and obligations in connection with practical identities. The reason why she distinguished between the categorical imperative and the moral law is that the categorical imperative commands the agent only to act according to the universalizable maxims, and that following the categorical imperative does not make one moral. It is when we reflectively acknowledge the value of universal humanity and act with a practical identity as members of the kingdom of purpose that we become moral. Korsgaard’s reinterpretation drew much criticism. A typical criticism is that it is too non-Kantian. The concept of practical identity comprises all elements that can be included in the answer to the question “Who am I?”. Korsgaard faced criticism for making the uniqueness of Kant’s philosophy disappear by saying that the egotistical rule of conduct or even the rule of wanton can also conform to the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative, separated from the moral law, raises the problem of arbitrariness in legislation that can be found in Hobbes’ monarch in the point that any rule of conduct can be adopted only if it can be willed in universalizable ways. In this paper, I first try to review Korsgaard’s reinterpretation of Kant's ethics analytically. We will examine the particular aspects of the normative question placed at the starting point of her philosophical research, and of the test of reflection proposed as a methodological procedure to find an answer to the normative question. I would like to take a favorable stance toward Korsgaard as much as possible. Even if Korsgaard made her arguments based on Kant’s philosophy, her statements do not have to be exactly in line with those of Kant, and the non-Kantian elements should be justly evaluated in themselves. The second thing I will do is to examine the meaning of universalizability that the categorical imperative separated from the moral law has in relation to “all” actions of an agent. I would like to show through the case of the reflective wanton that this universalizability can be given an appropriate meaning when it is understood in light of self-integrity rather than merely agent causality.