공매도와 판매관리비 정보의 체계적 관련성에 관한 연구

This study analyzed the effect of the selling general administrative (SG&A) cost signal and abnormal discretionary expenditure on short selling behavior to see if the SG&A information brings bias on the interpretation and investment decision of short-selling investors. SG&A expenditure traditionally has been considered as nagative signal for future firm value, but recent researches report positive aspects of SG&A expenditure for firms’s future performance (such as stock return, earnings). So, this study tests whether short-selling investor, recognized as a superior investor in the domestic capital market, accurately identifies the characteristics of SG&A expenditure and reflects them in the investment behavior based on information advantage on accounting information and sophisticated analysis ability. Our test results show that the short selling ratio increased as the proportion of SG&A increased and short-selling ratio fall as abnormal SG&A ratio level decreases than industry-year average. This result indicates that short-selling investors in the domestic market still treat SG&A expenditure as inefficiency of cost management. This study has academic and practical contribution to provide evidence that the short-selling investors, who are considered to be superior investors in the domestic market, have an interpretative bias for SG&A expenditure. This interpretative bias can induce distortion to the capital market investors by showing their position on firm with aggressive SG&A expenditure, which in turn, depress firms’ investment on future operations.