공정거래법 밖 지주회사의 이익의 질

[Purpose]This paper examines accruals quality of holding companies out Monoploy Regulation and Fair Trade Act(MRFTA). For this purpose, we compare the difference of earnings quality between holding companies out(hereinafter called “Holdings out MRFTA”) and in(called “Holdings in MRFTA”) MRFTA and investigate change of discretionary accruals after transition into holding companies respectively. [Methodology]Samples are selected among pure holdings companies belong special service industry of Korean standard industrial classification(M71000) from 1999 to 2020 and number of samples is 177 per year, which consist 106 Holdings out MRFTA and 71 Holdings in MRFTA per year, and 3,893 firm－year observations. [Findings]The results are as follows. First, earnings quality of the Holdings out MRFTA is lower than that of the Holdings in MRFTA, which means aggressive discretionary accruals of controlling shareholder exploiting the holding company system. Second, discretionary accruals of the Holdings out MRFTA is significantly increased after transition into holding company. Third, accruals quality of the Holdings in MRFTA is not persistent after transition because changes of discretionary accruals are opposite with or without absolute value. Fourth, earnings quality of the holdings out MRFTA is lower than that of the Holdings in MRFTA as the results of the additional analysis. [Implications]Contributed to precedent researches of holding companies, this paper investigates earnings quality of the Holdings out MRFTA in Korea for the first time. The results of this research emphasize the necessity of authority supervision on decrease of earnings quality in the Holdings out MRFTA.