대표발의자의 법률안심사소위원회 직책이 법률안 가결에 미치는 영향 분석 : 위원회 이론 중 이익분배 이론의 관점에서

This study pays attention to the decline in the National Assembly's legislative productivity(= number of passed bills/number of proposed bills). Given limited external checks on the National Assembly in the bill-making process, improving legislative productivity is essential for the development of democracy. We thus analyze 1) the probability of passing a bill and 2) the probability of passing a bill over time, depending on the position of the bill initiator in the subcommittee, which plays a key role in the legislative review process. First, we find that bill proposals initiated by subcommittee chairs have significantly higher passing rates than those initiated by general members of the subcommittee as well as by those who are not members of subcommittees, and bill proposals initiated by subcommittee members(both chairs and general members) have significantly higher passage rates than those initiated by non-members. In addition, we also find that bill proposals initiated by chairs and general members of the subcommittee are passed significantly faster than those initiated by non-members. Our finding suggests that with exclusive authority within the subcommittee, its members exert influence over the legislative review process, thereby increasing the probability of passing their proposed bills and decreasing the time required for passing them. Our analysis based on the data from subcommittees of the National Assembly seems aligned with the distributive benefits theory, where lawmakers perceive the committee as an instrumental target for pursuing political interests.