부보예금우선변제 전환에 따른 차등보험료율과 자기자본요구비율 간 유인부합적 규제조합

The current paper provides a model in which we analyze incentive compatible regulations, in terms of both capital requirement and risk-based deposit insurance premium, under the pro-rata sharing rule (PRS) and under the insured deposit preference (IDP) rule. We obtain the following results. First, capital adequacy requirements under both rules are increasing with the quality of banks (or their loan portfolios) which is the source of informational asymmetry between the bank and the regulator in the model. Under such capital adequacy requirements, a good (bad) bank chooses a combination of high (low) capital adequacy requirement and low (high) insurance premium to correctly reveal its true type to the regulator and hence to the funding market. Second, the change from the PRS rule to the IDP rule would give rise to an increase in banks’ credit supply especially to those customers with lower credit quality (e.g., SMEs) who would have been rejected under the PRS rule. Accordingly, the credit risk of the bank and hence the economy as a whole would get exacerbated while credits would be newly allowed to those customers with lower credit qualities. Finally, the impacts on the aggregate bank value as well as the government’s tax bills cannot be unambiguously determined. For more information, we provide a set of numerical examples in which uninsured debt financing is shown to decrease due to increased capital adequacy requirement, resulting in a decrease in both the aggregate bank value and the tax revenue.