미디어의 거버넌스 역할: 한국의 재벌기업 중심으로

This paper investigates the relationship between news coverage and investment decisions of firms belonging to Korean business groups (chaebols). For the empirical analyses, the paper focuses on acquisition attempts made by firms affiliated with the top 30 chaebols. In particular, this paper examines whether pre-acquisition media attention on acquirers, their parents, and their ultimate parents can be related to a manager’s decision to complete or abandon proposed acquisitions. To test the media’s monitoring role on business groups, this research further divides acquisition attempts into two types: those proposed by affiliated firms and those proposed by non-affiliated firms. To differentiate affiliated and non-affiliated firms for the empirical analysis, this paper constructs Top 30 dummy using the list of chaebols designated by the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC). This research presents the evidence that an increase in the pre-acquisition news coverage of firms affiliated with the top 30 largest chaebols is associated with a higher abandonment probability if the proposed deals have negative stock market returns at their announcement. This result suggests that the media can function as an effective governance mechanism for business groups where agency costs are expected to be high due to a concentrated ownership structure. In other words, the media can play an external monitoring role for Korean business groups.