양극화와 경제정의 ― 헌법상 경제조항을 중심으로 ―

Economic democratization was wrong from the start. The diagnosis of the cause of a financial combine being the main culprit of polarization and worsening distribution left only empty political slogans of economic democratization without providing practical solutions. It is difficult to interpret the economic democratization clause as if it guarantees the legitimacy of state intervention in the market. Article 119 (1) of the Constitution, which guarantees a liberal market economic order, is a principle, and paragraph (2) (economic democratization) is a complementary relationship. It should be noted that at the end of paragraph 2, the careful expression “can be done” was used, not the word “should be done” that implies the meaning of interference. There is a need for state intervention in the market, but even if it intervenes, it is not desirable to base economic democratization regulations that are ambiguous and overly comprehensive. The general opinion is that the reason for the expansion of social polarization was also due to the expansion of shareholder capitalism rather than a financial combine. Since the 1997 financial crisis, restructuring and a financial combine reforms have been carried out in a shareholder activism of foreign speculative capital, further deepening the polarization of the Korean economy. It is our economic democratization theory's intention to limit capitalists with state power, not civic consciousness. Human's historical experience that sustainable economic growth and polarization can be solved only under the balance of limited state power and mature civil society should be emphasized. This paper examines the political, economic, and social problems of polarization, the economic provisions of the Korean Constitution, how Germany and the United States affected the economic provisions of the Korean Constitution, and the task of realizing economic justice to solve the polarization problem.