한계기업의 존속 현상에 대한 미시경제학적 분석 및 정책적 시사점

This paper focused on the long-term survival of marginal companies through debt borrowing. First, through basic game theory, it was argued that there is a reasonable incentive to remain in the market if the exit cost of marginal companies is greater than that of corporate maintenance costs. Furthermore, it was argued that if the number of marginal companies in a similar situation in the same industry is large, the longer the incentive to survive can be strengthened because the more other companies exit first, the more advantageous it is for the remaining marginal companies. This suggests that the behavior of marginal companies that continue to remain unreasonable without exiting the market even though they suffer losses from operations is actually based on their own reasonable economic incentives. In addition, this paper intuitively derives the exit and maintenance cost functions of marginal companies based on realistic assumptions, and presents economic conditions to solve marginal company survival problems such as interest rates, industrial and macroeconomic conditions through an intuitive comparison between the two cost functions centered on the debt (B) variable. Specifically, the higher the interest rate and the higher the recoverable ratio of business fixed assets, the stronger the pressure on marginal companies to exit. Furthermore, by deriving not only the short-term but also the long-term maintenance cost function, the incentives of marginal companies to continue their operations through short-term borrowing from a long-term perspective were analyzed. In addition, this paper presents policy implications of policy authorities such as the Bank of Korea and the government based on the above analysis. Regarding the Bank of Korea’s interest rate policy, one of the most important means of monetary credit policy, it was discussed that a rate hike that comprehensively considers internal and external financial and economic conditions could have a side effect on marginal companies’ exit and restructuring pressure. In addition, the optimal conditions between the benefits and costs of financial support from the perspective of policy authorities, such as the Bank of Korea’s financial brokerage support loan system, and the benefits and costs of marginal companies receiving financial support were derived. Through this, it was emphasized that financial support policies for marginal companies need to be designed and operated in a balanced manner according to the conditions and circumstances faced by policy authorities and marginal companies, respectively.