최고경영진(Top Management Team)의 동질성이 주가급락위험에 미치는 영향

[Purpose]We examines the impact of top management team (TMT) homogeneity on stock price crash risk. In addition, we also explore the moderating effects of the CEO power and corporate governance on the relationship between TMT homogeneity and stock price crash risk. [Methodology]Our sample consists of Korean companies listed on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets from 2013 to 2019. The homogeneity level of the TMT was measured using the Herfindahl－Hirschman Index based on age, gender, education level, and work experience. We adopt the negative (－) conditional skewness and the ratio of down－to－up volatility as proxies for stock price crash risk. We employ the OLS regression as our main analyses. [Findings]The results of our empirical analyses show the positive relation between the homogeneity level of the TMT and the future stock price crash risk. This finding can be inferred as the outcome of increase in information asymmetry and a decrease in corporate transparency driven by high level of TMT homogeneity. Furthermore, the positive relationship between TMT homogeneity and stock price crash risk is strengthened when the CEO power is stronger. Whereas the relation is mitigated (1) when the ratio of outside directors is higher, (2) when the foreign investor ownership ratio is higher, and (3) when the company hires one of the BIG4 auditors. [Policy Implications]This study contributes to the literature about stock crash risk by investigating top management team homogeneity as a factor in stock price crash risk. By providing evidence that strong corporate governance mitigates the effect of TMT homogeneity on stock crash risk, this study calls for attention to the role of transparent corporate governance structure that performs an efficient monitoring function on the top management team. Thereby it provides policy implications for the corporate governance.